


A VARIANT OF WIENER'S ATTACK ON RSA WITH SMALL SECRET EXPONENT



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Wiener and Verheul - van Tilborg attacks

To speed up the RSA decryption one may try to use small secret decryption exponent d . The choice of a small d is especially interesting when there is a large difference in computing power between two communicating devices. However, in 1990, Wiener showed that if $d < n^{0.25}$, where $n = pq$ is the modulus of the cryptosystem, then there exist a polynomial time attack on the RSA. He showed that d is the denominator of some convergent p_m/q_m of the continued fraction expansion of e/n , and therefore d can be computed efficiently from the public key (n, e) .

In 1997, Verheul and van Tilborg proposed an extension of Wiener's attack that allows the RSA cryptosystem to be broken when d is a few bits longer than $n^{0.25}$. For $d > n^{0.25}$ their attack needs to do an exhaustive search for about $2t+8$ bits (under reasonable assumptions on involved partial convergents), where $t = \log_2(d/n^{0.25})$. In 2004, we introduced a slight modification of the Verheul and van Tilborg attack, based on Worley's result on Diophantine approximations, which says that all rationals p/q satisfying the inequality $|\alpha - p/q| < c/q^2$, for a positive real number c , are given by

$$\frac{p}{q} = \frac{rp_{m+1} \pm sp_m}{rq_{m+1} \pm sq_m}$$

for some $m \geq -1$ are nonnegative integers r and s such that $rs < 2c$.

Testing the candidates

In both mentioned extensions of Wiener's attack, the candidates for the secret exponent are of the form $d = rq_{m+1} + sq_m$. We test all possibilities for d , and number of possibilities is roughly (number of possibilities for r) \times (number of possibilities for s), which is $O(D^2)$, where $d = Dn^{0.25}$. More precisely, number of possible pairs (r, s) in Verheul and van Tilborg attack is $O(D^2 A^2)$, where $A = \max\{a_i : i = m+1, m+2, m+3\}$, while in our variant number of pairs is $O(D^2 \log A)$ (and also $O(D^2 \log D)$).

There are two principal methods for testing:

- 1) compute p and q assuming d is correct guess;
- 2) test the congruence $(M^e)^d \equiv M \pmod{n}$, say for $M = 2$.

Meet-in-the-middle

Here we present a new idea, which is to apply "meet-in-the-middle" to this second test. Let $2^{eq_{m+1}} \bmod n = a$, $(2^{eq_m})^{-1} \bmod n = b$. Then we test the congruence $a^r \equiv 2b^s \pmod{n}$. We can do it by computing $a^r \bmod n$ for all r , sorting the list of results, and then computing $2b^s \bmod n$ for each s one at a time, and checking if the result appears in the sorted list. This decrease the time complexity of testings phase to $O(D \log D)$ (with the space complexity $O(D)$).

We have implemented the proposed attack (in PARI and C++), and

it works efficiently for values of D up to 2^{30} , i.e. for $d < 2^{30}n^{0.25}$. For larger values of D the memory requirements become too demanded. However, a space-time tradeoff is possible, by using unsymmetrical variants of Worley's result (with different bounds on r and s). In that way, we expect that for 1024-bits RSA modulus n , the range in which this new method can be applied might be comparable with known attacks based on LLL-algorithm.

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